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In process industries, the application of functional safety in preventing major incidents is a well-
established practice. The functional safety standard IEC 61511[1] is applied to the safety 
instrumented system (SIS) protection layers to avoid the undesired events or reduce the 
likelihood of the events or impacts due to failures in the process, process equipment, or its 
control system including human interactions. However, there are risks of catastrophic incidents 
due to electrical equipment failures as well. Therefore, one should not underestimate the 
importance of the management, design, installation, operation, and maintenance of electrical 
power systems and protection devices. Regulatory authorities, in some countries, require the 
owners or operators to address the risks that arise from electrical equipment failure. 
 
The risk-based assessment, allocation of safety functions to protection devices, the establishment 
of integrity requirements, design, installation, operation, and maintenance of electrical protection 
devices must be managed like the protection layers for the process units. This paper focusses on 
the application of IEC 61511 to the protection of electrical equipment and systems, available 
industry guidelines, and the unique challenges in implementing the functional safety standards.  
The paper guides the electrical engineers with an example risk assessment, identification of 
protection device and its safety integrity level (SIL), verification of the reliability of the 






Functional safety is part of the overall safety relating to the process and the control system 
controlling the process, that depends on the correct functioning of the active protection layers. 
Safety instrumented systems (SIS) implementing safety instrumented functions (SIF) are active 
protection layers.  The functional safety standard provides guidelines to identify the target 
performance and manage the protection system for the entire safety life cycle covering 
specification, design, implementation, installation, commissioning, operation, maintenance, 
modifications and decommissioning activities associated with the protection system. A well-
managed protection system as per IEC 61511 will have the required integrity with adequate 
defenses against systematic failures. Internationally, the process industries accepted the 
functional safety standard IEC 61511 and is in use for the past two decades. 
 
The process safety deals with the incidents due to process, process equipment, control system 
controlling the process, and human interaction failures. The process facility incidents such as fire 
and explosions are not only due to the process plant failures but also can be due to electrical 
power distribution systems and equipment failures. Therefore, it is imperative that the risks 
arising from the reliability, availability, and survivability of the electrical power supply systems 
and failure of electrical equipment should be systematically addressed.  
 
The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) in the United Kingdom requires the following related to 
electrical power systems in chemical manufacturing processes [2]: 
 conduct a formal risk assessment of the fire and explosion risks arising from the 
electrical power supply and distribution systems; 
 establish a management system to design, install, operate and manage the electrical 
equipment and protection system; 
 
In response to the above requirements, the Energy Institute, London, published a guidance 
document “Guidance on Assessing the Safety Integrity of Electrical Supply Protection” [3] to 
manage the electrical protection systems by applying IEC 61511. In the United States of 
America, there is no explicit requirements or guidelines in applying the functional safety 
concepts for the electrical protection systems.  However, applying the functional safety life cycle 
principle provides a practical basis for managing the electrical protection systems. 
 
In this paper, discussed the application of IEC 61511 for the power protection systems, and how 
it differs from the process plant application. Also, provided example Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 
selection, SIL verification, and other safety life cycle activities relevant to the electrical 
protection systems. 
 
Safety life cycle  
 
The fundamental concept of IEC 61511 is the application of safety life cycle to the protection 














Risk assessment -Electrical H&RA 
 
In process plants, the equipment under control (EUC) is the process units/equipment. The 
process hazard and risk assessment (Process H&RA) is performed on the process units.  
Similarly, in electrical supply and distribution systems, the electrical hazard and risk assessment 
(Electrical H&RA) is carried out on the electrical supply systems and equipment such as 
generators, transformers, switchgears, MCCs,   motors, etc. The risk assessment steps such as 
identification of hazards and hazardous events, causes or the failures that lead to the hazardous 
events, estimating the likelihood and the consequence severity of the hazardous events, and 
determining the required risk reduction by the protection system meeting the risk tolerance 
criteria are essentially the same. However, there are differences between a process H&RA and an 
electrical H&RA as summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1. Process and Electrical H&RA- a comparison 
 
Item Process H&RA Electrical H&RA Similar/Difference 
Equipment under 
control (EUC) 
Process and equipment Electrical supply and 
distribution equipment 
Difference 
Hazardous events  leading to fire and 
explosion 





Serious injury/fatality Serious injury/fatality Similar 
Risk category Safety, environment, and 
commercial (asset) 










Initiating events Process and control 
system failures, human 
failures and mechanical 
equipment failures  




for the risk 
assessment 
P&IDs,  




Alarm and trip setpoints 
Design Criteria, 
Operating Philosophy, 
Protection and Control 
Philosophy, 
Power System Studies 
















Process and control 
systems engineers  
Electrical engineers Difference 




ground fault, etc.), 




Integrity analysis  Individual independent 
safety instrumented 
protection layer is 









Probability of ignition, 
probability of personnel 
presence, and 




Item Process H&RA Electrical H&RA Similar/Difference 
probability of injury or 
fatality 
and probability of 
injury or fatality 
 
For electrical equipment located in hazardous areas, the consequences of electrical power supply 
and distribution systems’ faults are uncontrolled arcs, short circuits, heating, etc., resulting in a 
fire or explosion, if flammable gases are present. Any of the above could lead to injuries to the 
personnel and /or equipment damage in that area. The failures mentioned are typically caused by 
random failure events, incorrect design, and installation.  The intent of this paper is to focus on 
random failure events described above.  
  
For example, a prolonged locked rotor situation due to mechanical jam could result in heating of 
the motor windings thereby causing the surface temperature of the motor enclosure to rise above 
its rated value. If this event were to occur in the presence of flammable gases and vapors, it could 
lead to a fire or an explosion.  In this example, the locked rotor is a fault which is the initiating 
event. The consequence is exceeding the surface temperature and igniting a vapor cloud resulting 
in injury to personnel.  
 
The likelihood and the consequence severity determines the risk of the scenario. The above-
assessed risk should be compared with the established risk tolerance criteria and determine 
whether any risk reduction is required. The protection arrangement applicable to the scenario 
should meet the required risk reduction. If a scenario risk meets the tolerable risk criteria and 
there is no further risk reduction is needed then, the protection arrangement does not have any 
special requirements as per the functional safety standards. Regardless of risk reduction 
requirements, the protection arrangements shall comply with the applicable codes, standards, and 
local regulations. 
 
The following documents are required for the electrical H&RA as a minimum: 
 
 Single line diagram (SLD) showing all the major components; 
 Operating and design philosophy document; 
 Power system protection philosophy including protection arrangement drawings; 
 Power system study report with fault level definitions and any transient analysis 
performed; 
 Failure rate data for various failures associated with the electrical equipment;  
 Hazardous area classification lay outs 
 Tolerable risk criteria; 
 
The team composition for electrical H&RA should include the following: 
 
 Electrical engineers well conversant with the power system and its protection; 
 A facilitator who is familiar with the risk assessment methodology and the electrical 
equipment and the processes being protected; 
 Operations and electrical maintenance representatives; 
 Vendor specialists as required; 
 Scribe to document the H&RA;  
 
The H&RA shall be recorded systematically with complete traceability to the various critical 




The electrical H&RA provides the likelihood and the consequence severity of a scenario which 
determines the risk.  The next step is to select safety integrity level (SIL) of the protection 
arrangement that meets the required risk reduction. A typical protection arrangement for an 
induction motor located in a hazardous area as shown in Figure 2 is considered to illustrate the 
SIL selection process. 
 
 




For the scenario described in the “Risk assessment” section above,  
 
Initiating event (IE)  locked rotor 
IE frequency   0.01/year [3] 
Consequence causing overcurrent in an induction motor located in a Zone 1 
hazardous area resulting in overheat of the windings with external 
and internal surface temperatures exceeding the specific T ratings 
of the hazardous area, and causing ignition of a co-incident gas 
release; 
Consequence severity injury/fatality to 1 or 2 persons. 
Tolerable frequency  1.0E-05/year 
 
Risk graph or Layer Protection Analysis (LOPA) is the commonly used methods to determine 
the required Risk Reduction Factor (RRF) and SIL. In this paper, LOPA methodology is used to 
determine the RRF and SIL. 
 
The LOPA equation is, 
 
𝑇𝑜𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦
= 𝐼𝐸 ∗ ( 𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) ∗ 𝑃𝑔𝑎𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑖𝑔𝑛 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑐𝑢 ∗ 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑗 
            (EQ-1)  
 
      
Where, 
IE  Initiating event frequency (per year) 
PFDavg   average probability of failure on demand 
𝑃𝑔𝑎𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 Probability of gas present  
𝑃𝑖𝑔𝑛  Probability of ignition 
𝑃𝑖𝑔𝑛  Probability of occupancy 
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑗  Probability of injury/fatality 
 
The motor is in Zone 1 area; therefore, the probability of gas present is 0.01. Assuming, if the gas is 
present at the time of the fault then, ignition is certain, and people are present most of the time in the area, 
and explosion will impact them, then, 
 
𝑃𝑖𝑔𝑛 = 1 
𝑃𝑜𝑐𝑢 = 1 
𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑗 = 1 
 
Applying the above factors, failure rate and tolerable frequency in the equation EQ-1 above, we have  
 
1.0E-05/year = (0.01/year) * 𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 * (0.01) *1*1*1 
 
Therefore, 𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 0.1, and  
 
𝑅𝑅𝐹 = (1/𝑃𝐹𝐷𝑎𝑣𝑔), i.e. RRF= 1/ (0.1) = 10.   
 
The above RRF (10) is within the range of SIL 1 per Table 4, IEC 61511-1. Therefore, the protection 
arrangement must meet the integrity of SIL 1.  
 
Independent protection layers  
 
In the protection arrangement shown in Figure 2, only the thermal relay B, tripping the motor contactor 
will be applicable as a protection layer. Neither the fuse nor the upstream overcurrent relay A will prevent 
the consequence from occurring. 
 
Therefore, it is important to note that the relevant protection devices for any scenario depend upon the 
nature of fault (i.e., initiating event).  For a short circuit situation, the Fuse (primary protection) and the 
overcurrent relay A (backup protection) tripping the motor contactor are the appropriate protection 
devices and not the thermal relay A.  
 
In electrical systems, in most of the scenarios, the protection layers are not independent. All the protection 
devices trip the same final actuation device such as a breaker or a contactor. For instance, in the locked 
rotor fault scenario described above, sometimes stall protection is provided in addition to thermal relay. 
But both the protection devices trip the same final element, motor contactor.  Therefore, the stall 
protection and thermal protection are not independent and hence they should be combined as a single 
protection layer and analyzed accordingly.  
 
Also, due to the advancement in the microprocessor based programmable device technology, many 
protections are implemented in a single device, known as “multi-function relay”. For example, electronic 
overload relays (EOL), depending on manufacturer/ model typically have protective capabilities such as 
overload, jam protection, current imbalance, phase loss, ground fault, phase reversal etc. In such cases, 
the independency between the various protection devices is lost and, therefore, common cause failures 
must be considered in the reliability analysis.  
 
SIL Verification  
 
After selecting a SIL target for the relevant protection arrangement, the next step is to verify that the 
protection arrangement will provide the required integrity. IEC 61511 and IEC 61508 require the 
following as part of the SIL verification: 
 
 Calculated PFDavg of the protection system shall be less than the target PFDavg obtained in the 
LOPA; 
 Hardware fault tolerance (HFT) of the protection arrangement shall meet the requirements of 
either IEC 61508 Route 1H or 2H or Table 6, IEC 61511-1 for the specified target SIL; 
 
PFDavg Calculation    
 
Probability of failure on demand of a protection layer depends on various parameters: 
 Failure rates of the components performing the protective function; 
 Redundant configuration of the devices and their logical voting to trip the breaker or contactor; 
 Testing interval and the extent of testing; 
 Diagnostics to detect the dangerous failures and the mean time to repair/restore; 
 
Failure rates  
 
The failure of a component can be spurious or dangerous. The spurious failure results in tripping the 
circuit without a demand. IEC 61511 designate these failures as safe failures.  Dangerous failures are 
those that fail to trip a breaker or a contactor when demand (fault) occurs. In probability of failure on 
demand calculations, the dangerous failure rates are required. 
 
There is always an uncertainty in the quantification of random failures. The failure rate is, probably, the 
least precise parameter used in performing SIL verifications [4]. Therefore, one must acknowledge that 
the results of the quantification are not real values, but rather a basis for comparing different design 
options and for monitoring the reliability performance during the operational phase of the safety lifecycle. 
The analysis is only a prediction. Historical performance is not the same as future performance.  
 
If the failure rates are conservative, then achieving target SIL will be demanding. However, optimistic 
failure rates will result in inadequate protection integrity. Therefore, the failure rates of components used 
in the analysis should be sufficiently realistic. 
 
There are many sources of failure rate data, such as application-specific, site-specific, company-specific, 
manufacturer-specific, industry-specific, and generic data. These failure rates can vary significantly by 
several orders of magnitude. While application specific or site specific data is the best option, but it can 
often be difficult to obtain.  
 
Some of the industry sources for the failure rates are: 
 
 IEEE publication, 493 - “IEEE Recommended Practice for the Design of Reliable Industrial and 
Commercial Power Systems” [5].  
 Energy Institute, London, publication “Guidance on Assessing the Safety Integrity of 
Electrical Supply Protection” [3]; 
 FARADIP.THREE, failure rate database, published by Technis, UK; 
 
Among the above sources, FARADIP.THREE provides spurious (designated as λS) and dangerous 





The protection devices must be tested. Longer the test interval, higher the PFD avg and difficult to meet 
higher SILs. The testing interval can be extended for low failure rate devices or if there are redundant 
devices in the protection arrangement. Frequent test interval may not be practical in a continuous process 
plant without shutting down the process units. Every effort should be made to coincide the testing with 




Microprocessor based relays are currently the industry standard, and these typically have diagnostic 
capability to monitor relay health. When configured appropriately, some of the dangerous failures are 
detected, and the protection device can be tested and repaired as required. In such situations, the 




Before performing the PFDavg calculation, drawing a reliability diagram depicting the protection 
arrangement applicable to the scenario will be useful. For the LV induction motor example described 
above, the reliability diagram for the locked rotor protection is shown in Figure 3.  
 
 





The PFDavg of the locked rotor protection arrangement is the sum of the PFDavg of all the components 
shown in the reliability diagram in series. 
 
i.e. PFD avg (locked rotor protection) = PFDavg (Current Transformer) + PFDavg (Thermal relay B) + PFDavg (motor 
contactor) 
 
All the above devices are simplex (not redundant) and therefore the following equation is applicable. 
PFDavg = 𝜆𝐷 ∗ (𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑙)/2 
 
Considering the test interval as five years and substituting the λD for each device, we have  
 
PFDavg (locked rotor protection) = [{(7.00E-04) *(5/2)} + {(8.76E-03) *(5/2)} + {(5.26E-03) *(5/2)}] 
i.e. PFDavg (locked rotor protection) = 3.68E-02 
 
The above calculated PFDavg (3.68E-02) is lower than the target PFDavg (0.1) and, therefore, the locked 
rotor protection arrangement comprising of thermal protection relay tripping the motor contactor meets 






Hardware Fault Tolerance (HFT)    
 
Irrespective of the hardware reliability calculated (PFDavg) for the design, the functional safety standard 
IEC 61511 specifies minimum levels of redundancy for each safety integrity level.  
There are two approaches: 
 Route 1H: Determination of HFT based on the calculated safe failure fraction (SFF); 
 Route 2H: Determination of HFT based on field experience and field data (proven-in-use) 
Route1H 
 
The Route1H approach uses SFF and the SIL target to determine the hardware fault tolerance. The SFF is 
defined as the sum of the potentially dangerous failures revealed by auto-test and those failures which 
result in a safe state, as a fraction of a total number of failures. 
SFF= 
[𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠(𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡)+𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠]
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠
 
The above is calculated for each element or subsystem, i.e., current transformer, thermal relay, and motor 
contactor). Two tables, Table 2 and Table 3, are provided in IEC 61508- Part 2. Table 2 is for “Type A” 
devices which are simple devices such as relays (no microprocessors and programming are involved), and 
Table 3 for “Type B” devices which are complex devices such as multifunction relays. Based on the SFF, 
device type, and the SIL target, the hardware fault tolerance is determined using Table 2 and Table 3, 
which are reproduced from IEC 61508 Part 2 for reference.  
 
Table 2. Maximum allowable integrity level for a safety function carried out by a type A 
safety related element or subsystem 
 
Safe failure fraction (SFF) of an element Hardware fault tolerance (HFT) 
0 1 2 
< 60% SIL 1 SIL 2 SIL 3 
60% - < 90% SIL 2 SIL 3 SIL 4 
90% - < 99% SIL 3 SIL 4 SIL 4 
≥ 99% SIL 3 SIL 4 SIL 4 
 
Table 3. Maximum allowable integrity level for a safety function carried out by a type B 
safety related element or subsystem 
 
Safe failure fraction (SFF) of an element Hardware fault tolerance (HFT) 
0 1 2 
< 60% Not allowed SIL 1 SIL 2 
60% - < 90% SIL 1 SIL 2 SIL 3 
90% - < 99% SIL 2 SIL 3 SIL 4 




In Route 2H, the hardware fault tolerance is specified by the functional safety standard for each SIL target 
if the device is selected based on well documented and verified field based failure rate data with 90% 
statistical confidence. For low demand application (electrical faults are low demand mode of operation) 
with SIL 1 or SIL 2 target, there is no need for any redundancies (HFT=0), and SIL 3 requires one 
redundant element (HFT=1).  
 
Unless the field failure data with 90% confidence levels are available, the Route 2H cannot be justified. 
Many of the electrical components are reliable and field proven and, therefore, Route 2H can be the best 
approach if a proper documentation of failure rate data for specific applications is available. 
 
For microprocessor-based protection devices where sophisticated hardware and software are involved, the 
protection devices must be evaluated by competent organizations such as TUV, SIRA, FM, etc., to ensure 
compliance with IEC 61508- Part 2 (hardware) and IEC 61508- Part 3 (software).  Route 1H will be 
appropriate for microprocessor -based protection devices.  
 
For electromechanical devices, there should be sufficient operating experience enabling the analyst to use 
historical failure rate data as part of the reliability analysis and Route 2H for HFT evaluation. 
 
All the elements of a subsystem must meet or exceed the hardware fault tolerance requirements for the 
specified target SIL. For the locked rotor example described above, the hardware fault tolerance is applied 
as per Route 1H to illustrate the methodology, and the analysis is tabulated in Table 4. 
 
















Type A 61% SIL 1 0 0 SIL 2 
Thermal Relay Type A 89% SIL 1 0 0 SIL 2 
Motor Contactor Type A 89% SIL 1 0 0 SIL 2 
Overall SIL Claimed per HFT SIL 2 
 
 
From the above, the safety function provided by the thermal relay tripping the motor contactor meets SIL 
1 as per PFDavg calculation and SIL 2 as per HFT criteria. Therefore, the safety function meets SIL 1 
integrity per the functional safety standard. 
 
Factory acceptance testing (FAT) 
 
Factory testing of the complete protection system as per the testing procedures should be carried out and 
the reports should be available. Factory testing should include primary current injection and secondary 
current injection testing. If primary current injection cannot be adequately achieved at the manufacturer’s 
location then, the protection system manufacturer should provide the site testing methodology including 
the checking sequences. 
 
Installation and Commissioning 
 
The protection system must be installed as per the installation drawings, safety manuals, and 
manufacturer’s recommendation. Any deviations must be subject to safety review process before 
performing any site modifications.  Before energizing the equipment, the following must be carried out as 
part of the commissioning to ensure the protection function(s) will perform as intended: 
 
 Checking of the protection settings per protection setting study report; 
 Additional testing which has not been performed during the FAT; 
 Re-checks of primary and secondary current injection testing where major components of the 
system are reassembled at site; 
 
Inspection and testing  
 
Operation and maintenance are the longest periods in the safety life cycle. The functional safety standards 
require continuous performance monitoring, including demand rates, failure modes and failure rates of 
various components. The actual performance must be compared with the predicted performance to 
identify any gaps so that remedial measures can be provided with appropriate safety review.   
 
The protective functions must be inspected and tested at the intervals as determined per SIL verification 
calculations. In the above example, the test interval is five years. The inspection and testing procedures 
shall comply with the manufacturer’s recommendations. If the devices of protective functions are not 
tested as per the test intervals considered in the SIL verification calculations and as per the manufacturer’s 
recommendations then, the functional safety is not achieved for the specified protective functions. The 
records of testing shall be maintained. Any performance degradation must be analyzed and if required 
revise the testing periods to sustain the required SIL.  
 
The failure rates considered in the calculations are applicable only during the useful life of the devices. 
Therefore, it is important to check the useful life and replace the components as required. 
 
Auditing and Assessments 
 
The risk assessment, SIL selection and other life cycle activities, work processes and application of 
procedures must be periodically audited.  Also, auditing shall take place whenever modifications are 
under taken.  
 
Management of change (MOC) 
 
In any process facility, making changes to the protective system, equipment and procedures are 
inevitable.  Modifications are required for a variety of reasons due to evolution of the technology, 
equipment malfunctions, and obsoleteness.  
 
Many regulations require employers to establish and implement written procedures to manage changes, 
except ‘replacements in kind.’  A robust management of modifications procedures shall be in place to 
initiate, document, review, implement and approve changes to protective functions other than 
replacements in kind. A robust change management process will ensure protective function integrity 




The personnel undertaking the safety life cycle activities must be competent in performing the activities. 
The competency must be managed to ensure systematic errors are minimized. Any deficiencies must be 




Electrical power supply and distribution systems generate, store and transmit large amounts of energy and 
the faults in the system may lead to catastrophic incidents in any process facility, like process and process 
equipment failures.  A risk based robust management system helps to assess the risk and to specify, 
design, install, operate, and maintain the electrical protection systems. The principles of performance 
based functional safety standard IEC 61511 provide a frame work to establish an effective management 
system.  Electrical protection systems designed, operated and maintained per functional safety standards 
meet the regulatory requirements and helps to sustain the integrity throughout the life cycle of the 
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